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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PUBLIC OPTIONS: THE NEED FOR LONG-TERM CARE, ITS
COSTS, AND GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THEM
“Life would be infinitely happier if we could only be born at the age of
eighty, and gradually approach eighteen.”—Mark Twain1
There is a profound moment in a person’s life when the thought of
growing old becomes real. With that moment comes the sadness of
knowing that you are running out of time, that life is surprisingly short, and
that there is no going back. Time seems to have vanished. Naturally,
people cope with this moment in different ways. Some deny old age and go
on living as though they are ageless. Others embrace the possibility of
being an Elder and having the wisdom that comes only with age. Many
people simply try to make the most of it, and look forward to retirement as a
time of relaxation and reflection. A universal truth is that humans have a
natural desire to live, and to live as long as they can, and as time marches
on this becomes more and more difficult. We see ourselves getting old, but
do not (or refuse to) fully see the price of age. Our bodies pay that price,
and, unfortunately, so do our minds. The human desire to live has found
new zeal in modern medicine, which has expanded the average life span by
nearly two decades since 1900.2 As more and more of us live longer, more
and more of us are paying that price of age.
Because of longer life spans, we have time to plan for the end of life,
and this is where things get complicated. People do not want to envision
themselves at the end of their lives sitting in a wheelchair in the common
area of a nursing home, idle, impoverished, half-mad, and at the mercy of
meagerly-paid staff who must take care of your every need, including your
diet, hygiene, and even the position in which you sleep. Many of these
conditions are ones reserved in our society for felons and the criminally
insane. It is only natural for people to reject the notion of living in this state.
We would rather spend our final years at home.3 Therefore, as a nation, we

1. WILLIAM LYON PHELPS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY WITH LETTERS 965 (1939).
2. Elizabeth Arias, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., United States Life Tables, 2006, 58 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 21, 2010 at 4.
3. Robert W. Stock, Health Care Reform Will Impact Long-Term Care, AOL NEWS (Mar.
26, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/healthcare/article/few-know-health-care-lawhas-class/19413357 (“Surveys show that 90 percent of Americans want to age at home.”)
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do not sufficiently plan for a time when we may have to live in a nursing
home.
Roughly one-third of Americans will spend some time in a nursing home
during their lives.4 The cost of living in a nursing home is catastrophic for
the average middle class American: $72,000 per year.5 Assisted living
environments, which provide long-term care at a less-intense level, cost
$38,000 per year.6 Although only 14% of long-term care recipients live in
these institutions, the cost to care for them makes up 70% of all of the
money spent on long-term care in the United States.7 The other 86% of
long-term care recipients, comprised of disabled children and adults, as well
as some elderly persons, receive their care in the home.8 Obviously, longterm care in the home is far less expensive than institutionalized care.
However, due to the high costs of institutionalized care, a lack of planning
by Americans to properly finance their own long-term care, and a
government-bias in favor of nursing homes, the costs of long-term care
threatens to become one of our society’s greatest burdens in the coming
decades.
Much has been said about gridlock in Washington. The two political
parties seem locked in a perpetual state of fighting, at the expense of
allowing long-term problems to fester to crisis levels. Funding of long-term
care, however, has received some attention, and there is at least a
consensus in the American political establishment that the future of longPieces of legislation from both
term care funding is a problem.9
Republicans and Democrats have demonstrated a desire to address the
issue.10 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”) included a lengthy

4. Gary A. Simon, Can Long-Term Care Insurance Be Fixed?, J. HEALTH CARE FIN., Fall
2010, at 51, 51.
5. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 2186-07, MEDICAID AND LONGTERM CARE SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (2010) [hereinafter KFF MEDICAID LTC], available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/2186-07.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE BOOMERS: A PUBLIC
POLICY CHALLENGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (1991); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-06-401, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: FEDERAL PROGRAM COMPARED FAVORABLY
WITH OTHER PRODUCTS, AND ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS TREND COULD INFORM FUTURE DECISIONS 1
(2006); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY ix, xi
(2004).
10. See 124 Stat. 119 442-54 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 30011); see also
Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 54-155 (2005)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396); see also Dems Offer Mixed Views on CLASS Act’s Demise,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2011/
October/27/class-act.aspx. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was amended by
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number of provisions limiting Medicaid eligibility and encouraging home
and community-based care over more costly nursing home care.11 The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)12, however, was far
more sweeping. Among other provisions, it established the Community
Living Assistance Services and Support (CLASS) Act.13 CLASS was going to
be the first government-sponsored long-term care insurance policy.14 It was
unique. Unlike Medicare, which is funded by mandatory payroll taxes,
CLASS was to be funded by voluntary payroll taxes.15 Unlike Medicaid,
which is taxpayer-funded, CLASS was to be funded almost-exclusively by
these voluntary premiums.16 Unlike private health insurance, CLASS
enrollees would not be denied coverage once they were vested and had the
requisite number of functional limitations to qualify for the benefit.17
Although CLASS was designed to expand the number of Americans
covered by non-Medicaid long-term care insurance, it was set up in a way
that made it very difficult, if not impossible, to remain a fiscally solvent
program without an alternative source of funding. Consequently, in
October 2011, the Obama Administration announced that it was
abandoning the CLASS program.18 This article will show that there is
certainly a need for a program like CLASS; however, under its current
structure, the CLASS program could not have realistically remained fiscally
solvent. Therefore, to reach the goals that CLASS was designed to achieve,
the government must either make participation in the program mandatory or
require that all Americans purchase private long-term care insurance.
Failure by the government to take decisive action, and instead to continue to
take the approach seen in the DRA, could allow an already-serious fiscal
problem to grow into a crisis for both the public and private sectors.

Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010). These two laws will be hereinafter cited together as “ACA.”
11. See DRA, 120 Stat. at 54-155.
12. See ACA § 2406.
13. See ACA § 8002 (to be codified 42 U.S.C. § 30011); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., A REPORT ON THE ACTUARIAL, MARKETING, AND LEGAL ANALYSES OF THE CLASS
PROGRAM 1 (2011) [hereinafter HHS CLASS REPORT].
14. See John Inglehart, Long-Term Care Legislation At Long Last?, 29 HEALTH AFF., 8
(2010).
15. See HHS CLASS REPORT, supra note 13, at 1.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 1-2, 30.
18. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to
Congress (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/letter10142011.html;
see also Scott Spoerry, Obama Drops Long-Term Health Care Program, CNN POLITICS (OCT.
14, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-14/politics/politics_health-care-program_1_long
-term-care-sebelius-community-living-assistance-services?_s=PM:POLITICS.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF LONG-TERM CARE
Unlike other areas of health care, the vast majority of long-term care in
the United States, whether it is in skilled nursing facilities, assisted living, or
in-home care, is funded by the federal government and the states. This is a
unique area of the healthcare industry, as the private insurance industry
accounts for only 9% of its funding.19 Another one-fifth of funding is paid
out-of-pocket by private citizens.20 Twenty-three percent of funding comes
from Medicare, which covers “post-acute care through its skilled nursing
facility benefit and its home health care benefit.”21 This coverage fully
terminates after a maximum period of 100 days.22 The only other source
left is Medicaid, the government’s health insurance program for the poor.
Over half of long-term care coverage for periods exceeding 100 days, 23
and 80% of coverage exceeding three years,24 comes from Medicaid.
Therefore, in the world of long-term care, federal and state governments
play much more important roles, and have much greater responsibilities, in
ensuring that long-term care is both available for their citizens and
affordable for their taxpayers. Medicaid is financed through a federal-state
matching fund system.25 The amount of money that a state pays for
Medicaid is matched by the federal government at a set rate called the
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”).26 The rate is designed to
provide a matching fund appropriate to each state’s level of per capita
income with the overall goal of achieving a funding system that distributes
the financing of Medicaid at a relatively equal level, with a slightly greater
share of spending made by the federal government in each state.27
Since its inception in 1965, Medicaid has always covered long-term
care in skilled nursing homes.28 It has covered care at the intermediate level
19.
20.
21.
22.

KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 1.
Id.
Id.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICARE COVERAGE OF SKILLED NURSING FACILITY CARE 3 (2007).
23. Melissa Baum & Jason A. Frank, Level of Care Standard: Maryland Medical
Assistance Long-Term Care & Medical Eligibility Issues, MD. BAR J., March/April 2008, at 45,
46; KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 1 (51% of the remaining market share after removing
Medicare).
24. H. Stephen Kaye et al., Long-Term Care: Who Gets It, Who Provides It, Who Pays,
and How Much?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 11, 11, 17 (2010).
25. VICTORIA WACHINO ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 7000,
FINANCING THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: THE MANY ROLES OF FEDERAL AND STATE MATCHING FUNDS 3
(2004), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Financing-the-Medicaid-ProgramThe-Many-Roles-of-Federal-and-State-Matching-Funds-Policy-Brief.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Baum & Frank, supra note 23, at 46.
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(assisted living and residential care facilities) since the 1970’s,29 and has
allowed states to cover home and community-based care through a waiver
system since 1981.30 Since it is designed to cover the poor, Medicaid
applicants must meet a number of eligibility factors before qualifying for
long-term care coverage. Eligibility requirements can vary significantly in
each state. For example, thirty-eight states require a level of income at or
below 300% of SSI.31 Another ten states have lower thresholds, and two
states have no income limits.32 Resource guidelines vary as well, but are
generally strict: although a homestead is usually exempt in the eligibility
determination,33 in most states a single person or a married couple can
have no more than $2,000–$3,000 in assets.34 Countable assets can
include a variety of personal possessions: all liquid resources (cash, stocks,
bonds, IRAs, etc.), burial lots with the exception of lots being used for the
applicant’s personal burial, extra vehicles, rental property, life insurance
cash surrender value, jewelry, and even furniture in storage.35 If an
applicant has transferred any of these types of resources to a third-party
(other than a spouse) within five years of applying for Medicaid, she or he
may be denied nursing home or home and community-based (“HCB”) care
coverage for a certain period of time.36 Therefore, to finally get to a point
at which Medicaid will cover a person’s nursing home stay or HCB care,
that person must become impoverished, either through five or more years of
continuous poverty or by spending down resources until they become
sufficiently scarce to meet the guidelines. The result is a long-term care
population, the majority of which is impoverished.
The demand for long-term care is already increasing.37 First, it should
be noted that there is a vast population of unpaid caretakers in this country.
There are 9.9 million Americans receiving no compensation for caring for

29. Id.
30. Id. at 47.
31. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 8048, MEDICAID FINANCIAL
ELIGIBILITY: PRIMARY PATHWAYS FOR THE ELDERLY AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 3 (2010)
[hereinafter KFF MEDICAID FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/up
load/8048.pdf.
32. Id. (stating Missouri and Indiana have no income limits).
33. Id. (stating homesteads are exempt up to $500,000 in equity in most states).
34. Id. at 5.
35. The definition of assets is determined by each state individually. See generally MO.
CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 40-2.030 (2006) (outlining the types of assets that may be
considered in eligibility determinations).
36. KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 2.
37. DANIEL I. SHOSTAK & PAUL A. LONDON, STRATEGIC AFFAIRS FORECASTING, STATE
MEDICAID EXPENDITURES FOR LONG-TERM CARE 2008-2027, at 3, 4 (2008), available at
http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?docid=24597.
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the Alzheimer’s disease and dementia-suffering population alone.38 The
existence of such a population is likely to increase with the need for longterm care, creating an entire sector of the public that works in a capacity of
“voluntary servitude (albeit for loved ones)” for little or no real
compensation. The implications this situation has for the demand for public
assistance, lack of productivity, and a decreased quality of life are obvious.
Taxpayers fare no better. Nursing home coverage is the fastest growing
area of Medicaid coverage,39 and is likely to increase at a faster rate than
“all health care expenditures, Medicare, Medicaid, and the national Gross
Domestic Product.”40
Even in the most optimistic . . . scenario, which assumes that disability rates
fall by 1 percent per year, the size of the disabled population will grow by
more than 50 percent between 2000 and 2040 and the number of disabled
older adults for every adult age 25 to 64 will increase.41

A doubling of long-term care expenditures, combined with expected
increases in Medicare and Social Security spending over the same period of
time, could become a catastrophic burden on the public sector. Moreover,
when we consider that an additional one-fifth of long-term care spending is
paid out-of-pocket by private individuals,42 long-term care could become a
tremendous financial burden on all Americans, and will consume a larger
and larger portion of the nation’s wealth.
II. ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
In the years preceding the ACA, a number of laws enacted were
designed to promote the use of private long-term care insurance. Section
6021 of the DRA attempts to expand the State Long-Term Care Partnership
Program.43 In participating states, Medicaid applicants who own long-term
care policies are allowed an asset disregard equal to the amount of longterm care benefits received under the policy.44 “For example, if a person
uses $50,000 of insurance coverage, the same amount of assets (up to the
policy maximum) would be disregarded if that person applies for

38.
39.
40.
41.

ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2009 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 33 (2009).
SHOSTAK & LONDON, supra note 37, at 3.
Id.
CHANGES IN HEALTH CARE FIN. & ORG. INITIATIVE (HCFO), ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND., FINDINGS BRIEF: MEETING THE FUTURE LONG-TERM CARE NEEDS OF THE BABY BOOMERS 3
(2007).
42. KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 1.
43. Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6021, 120 Stat. 4, 68
(2006).
44. NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE ON LONG-TERM
CARE PARTNERSHIP POLICIES, available at http://www.doi.ne.gov/ltcare/partnership_policies.pdf.
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Medicaid.”45 The DRA requires all states to honor “partnership policies”
owned by Medicaid applicants from a partnership state, as long as the
states involved have a reciprocity agreement with each other at the time the
individual applies for Medicaid in the “non-partnership” state.46 As a result
of this provision, most states are now participating in the long-term care
partnership program.47 Section 6021 also establishes the creation of a
national clearinghouse for long-term care information, designed to inform
consumers on the availability and limits of Medicaid long-term care
coverage, provide “objective information” to help consumers decide
whether to purchase private long-term care insurance policies, and maintain
a list of states that have long-term care partnership programs.48 Moreover,
since 2005 the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) has
promoted the purchase of private long-term care insurance through its
Long-Term Care Campaign, the goal of which is “to increase consumer
awareness about, and planning ahead for, long-term care.”49
The DRA contained a number of provisions designed to discourage
people from using Medicaid to pay for long-term care (presumably with the
secondary intention of promoting the use of private policies and out-ofpocket spending). In fact, over 40% of the text of the DRA is dedicated to
changes in Medicaid eligibility rules.50 Sections 6011 and 6016 involve
penalties for applicants who transfer assets in order to qualify for Medicaid
coverage.51 Instead of looking back thirty-six months, state agencies are
now required to look back sixty months from the month of application to
determine if any transfers of assets occurred.52 A penalty applies to transfers
in which the applicant received less than the fair market value for the
asset.53 For example, if a person signs a quitclaim deed to a friend for real
property, essentially giving the property away, the fair market value of that
property would be the amount of the penalty. If the property is assessed to
be worth $9,000, the penalty would be that amount divided by “the average

45. David G. Stevenson et al., The Complementarity of Public and Private Long-Term
Care Coverage, 29 HEALTH AFF. 96, 99 (2010).
46. DRA § 6021.
47. Stevenson et al., supra note 45, at 99.
48. DRA § 6021.
49. Long-Term Care Awareness Campaign: Own Your Future, AGING & DISABILITY
RESOURCE CENTER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE EXCHANGE, 1, http://www.adrc-tae.org/tiki-down
load_file.php?fileId=1956 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011); see also U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., National Clearinghouse for Long-Term Care Information, LONGTERMCARE.GOV,
http://www.longtermcare.gov/LTC/Main_Site/Index.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
50. See generally DRA.
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(D)(ii), 1396(H) (2006).
52. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i).
53. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(A).
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monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility services in the state . . . at
the time of application.”54 Therefore, if the average monthly cost is $3,000,
the person would not be able to use Medicaid to pay for nursing home
coverage for three months. Under previous law, this transfer penalty period
began the first day after the month the transfer occurred.55 The DRA
changed the penalty period to begin on the first day of the month of
application or the first day of the month after the transfer, whichever is
later.56 States are also empowered to combine penalty periods for different
transfers into one period covering all of them.57 Although a somewhat
morbid thought, creating longer, continuous transfer periods saves
governments money, since it increases the likelihood that a resident will no
longer be a nursing home resident by the time the transfer period expires.
Medicaid applicants who attempt to transfer assets by “loaning” the money
are also subject to more restrictions. Any loan that they issue must be
actuarially sound, provide for equal payments with no balloon payments
allowed, and prohibit the cancellation of the debt upon the death of the
lender.58 Finally, the purchase of a life estate in another individual’s home
is now considered a transfer of property unless the purchaser resides in that
home for at least a year after the sale.59
Section 6012 limits eligibility for clients who have annuities.60
Regardless of whether the applicant receives income from the annuity,61 the
entire value of this asset counts as a resource (note that the Medicaid
resource maximum for a single person is usually no more than $2,000)62
unless it meets some very specific requirements. First, the state must be
named the “remainder beneficiary” of the annuity to allow the state to
recover any Medicaid expenditures it may make on behalf of the
annuitant.63 The state becomes a secondary beneficiary to the annuity if the
Medicaid recipient has a spouse living in the community or a disabled child
designated as a beneficiary in the annuity.64 If either of these parties
attempts to transfer or dispose of the proceeds from the annuity for less than

54. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(E)(i)(II).
55. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)(i).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2006).
57. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(H)(i)-(ii).
58. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(I)(i)-(iii).
59. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(J).
60. Id. § 1396p(e)(1).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1) (2006); Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109171, § 6012(d), 120 Stat. 4, 64 (2006).
62. KFF MEDICAID FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY, supra note 31, at 5.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1) (2006).
64. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(F)(ii).
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fair market value, the state becomes the primary beneficiary.65 Second, the
annuity must be irrevocable and non-assignable, meaning that it cannot be
cashed out or transferred.66 Third, the annuity must be actuarially sound in
accordance with the requirements of Office of Chief Actuary of the Social
Security Administration.67 Finally, the annuity must provide regular income
in equal amounts to the annuitant, with no deferrals and no balloon
payments allowed.68 Individual Retirement Annuities under Section 408(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code, or Deemed IRAs under “Qualified Employer
Plans” under Section 408(q) are also not counted as resources.69 If the
annuity does not count as a resource, the income stream from the annuity
counts as unearned income toward the applicant’s eligibility for Medicaid.
These provisions tighten the ability of an applicant to shelter his assets by
organizing them into an annuity, thus converting the assets into income.70
If the annuity does not count as a resource, the income stream from the
annuity counts as unearned income toward the applicant’s eligibility for
Medicaid. These provisions tighten the ability of an applicant to shelter
one’s assets by organizing them into an annuity, thus converting the assets
into income.71 Section 6013 affects the “Income-First Rule,” which is used
by many states to determine the portion of income and resources from an
institutionalized Medicaid recipient that can be allotted to one’s spouse
remaining in the community. A primary purpose of this provision is to allow
the institutionalized spouse to receive Medicaid while not impoverishing the
community spouse (a problem known as ‘spousal impoverishment’).72 To
receive an income allotment, the community spouse’s income must be
below a certain level.73 The community spouse’s total share of the couple’s
resources must also remain below a limit known as the Community Spouse
Resource Allowance (“CRSA”), which, due to automatic adjustments, can be
as high as $100,000.74 Any amount of resources over the CRSA counts
In income-first states, if the
against the institutionalized spouse.75

65. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(F)(i).
66. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(I).
67. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(II).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(III) (2006).
69. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(i)(I).
70. The Section 6012 provisions have been limited in scope by recent court decisions.
E.g., Lopes v. Starkowski, No. 3:10-CV-307 (JCH), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81829, at *6-7 (D.
Conn. Aug. 11, 2010).
71. Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(6) (2006).
73. Id. § 1396r-5(d)(6) (2006).
74. Id. § 1396r-5(f)(2); see also Sandra L. Smith, 2011 Elder Law Numbers, LEXISNEXIS
COMMUNITIES: EST. PRAC. & ELDER LAW COMMUNITY (Jan. 14, 2011, 3:55 PM),
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(1)-(2) (2006).
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community spouse’s income is below a certain amount, he or she may be
able to retain more resources than the CRSA usually allows.76 The changes
in section 6013 require that the community spouse’s allotment be
determined before considering one’s resource allowance.77 Therefore, it is
more difficult for Medicaid applicants to shelter their resources through their
spouse.
Section 6014 puts restrictions on the “homestead exemption.”78
Traditionally, a person’s home and the surrounding property do not count
as a resource against Medicaid eligibility. This section provides that, once a
person’s equity in his or her home exceeds $500,000, the homestead
counts as a resource.79 States are given the option of increasing this limit to
no more than $750,000.80 Starting in 2011, this limit will adjust with the
Consumer Price Index “to the nearest $1,000.”81 Section 6032 requires
that any provider that gets at least $5 million per year in Medicaid payments
must create written policies for its employees and contractors addressing
Medicaid fraud and whistleblower protections.82 Section 6034 established
the Medicaid Integrity Program, designed to create a dedicated government
entity that regularly reviews and audits Medicaid-receiving providers to
ensure that they comply with the law.83 The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) defines its role under the Medicaid Integrity
Program as twofold:
To hire contractors to review Medicaid provider activities, audit claims,
identify overpayments, and educate providers and others on Medicaid
program integrity issues [and] [t]o provide effective support and assistance
to States in their efforts to combat Medicaid provider fraud and abuse.84

76. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CTR. FOR MEDICAID & STATE OPERATIONS,
SECTIONS 6011 AND 6016: NEW MEDICAID TRANSFER OF ASSET RULES UNDER THE DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, at 19 (2006), available at http://www.canhr.org/medcal/PDFs/TOA
Enclosure.pdf ; see also The Impact of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 on Medi-Cal for LongTerm Care , CAL. ADVOC. FOR NURSING HOME REF., http://www.canhr.org/newsroom/newdev_
archive/past/20060331_DFRA_analysis.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(6) (2006).
78. Id. § 1396p(f).
79. Id. § 1396p(f)(1)(A).
80. Id. § 1396p(f)(1)(B).
81. Id. § 1396p(f)(1)(C).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(68)(A)-(C) (2006); see also The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005:
New Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Provisions, BASS BERRY & SIMS PLC (May 31, 2006),
http://www.bassberry.com/files/Publication/1ece9b4e-766d-4923-91f4-0f74895e37a6/Pre
sentation/PublicationAttachment/efac6bcc-973c-4876-ac60-11d55a6fede9/Health%20Law
%20Update%20May%2031%202006.pdf.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-6(a), (b) (2006).
84. Overview Medicaid Integrity Program, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidIntegrityProgram/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
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These sections also include anti-fraud provisions that restrict deceptive
practices by pharmacies,85 require providers to report more information
about their patients and claims,86 and require Medicaid applicants to
provide proof of identity and citizenship.87
This laundry list of reforms was intended to reduce the number of longterm care recipients receiving Medicaid, and promote the expansion of the
private long-term care insurance industry. The DRA was modestly successful
in increasing the number of Medicaid long-term care recipients receiving
cheaper home and community-based care as opposed to nursing home
care.88 However, these initiatives have had little to no impact on the sale of
long-term care policies, which “have been flat or down” since the DRA was
passed.89 In 2006, the Lifespan Respite Care Act authorized HHS to award
grants and “cooperative agreements” to state agencies for programs that
“expand and enhance respite care services to family caregivers” and
improve access to and coordination of these services.90 Respite care
services are designed to assist in-home caregivers, many of whom are
unpaid, by providing care to allow the caregiver time away from his or her
responsibilities. Although a relatively small piece of legislation, the Lifespan
Respite Care Act does acknowledge the ever-growing population of unpaid
caregivers who fill the void caused by the insufficient presence of long-term
care insurance in the United States.91 It is clear, however, that laws like the
DRA, which attempt to reduce reliance on Medicaid in favor of private
insurance by limiting Medicaid eligibility requirements, are ineffective.
Legislators would be wise to study the fundamental challenges facing the
long-term care insurance industry, which go far deeper than anything the
DRA attempted to address.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE PRIVATE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Americans are woefully unprepared to pay for their own long-term care
coverage. In a 2001 survey, only one-fourth of Americans age 45 and over

85.
86.
87.
88.

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(10)(D) (2006).
Id. § 1396a(a)(25)(I)(i).
Id. § 1396b(x).
AVALERE HEALTH LLC, MEDICAID-FINANCED HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES
RESEARCH / A SYNTHESIS 2 (2007), available at http://www.ahcancal.org/research_data/fund
ing/Documents/HCBS_Research_Synthesis.pdf.
89. HOWARD GLECKMAN, THE URBAN INST., LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING REFORM: LESSONS
FROM THE U.S. AND ABROAD 20 (2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/
media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Feb/1368_Gleckman_longterm_care_financi
ng_reform_lessons_US_abroad.pdf.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 300ii-1(a) (2006).
91. GLECKMAN, supra note 89, at 1.
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could identify the cost of nursing home care within a range of 20%.92
Three-fourths of them mistakenly believed that Medicare either covers
assisted living expenses or did not know whether it did or not.93 This chronic
lack of preparedness increases the likelihood that, when these Americans
need long-term care, they will also need Medicaid, and need it for a longer
period of time. On its face, private long-term care insurance is more
desirable than Medicaid.
Private policies generally pay more than
Medicaid, so nursing homes benefit from them.94 Also, if a person has
private coverage, it is less likely he will need Medicaid, which saves taxpayer
dollars. A person does not necessarily have to impoverish herself to use
private long-term care insurance.
Scholars have found a diverse array of reasons why Americans avoid
getting long-term care insurance. Part of the problem is the way long-term
care insurance is structured. The typical health insurance policy covers most
of the care a person receives, whether it is preventive care, hospital or
emergency room treatment, tests, etc. (after any deductibles and co-pays
that may apply). Long-term care, however, is a different phenomenon. It
involves the need for daily care that can last for years, may not be necessary
for decades, and that can take a variety of forms, including personal
hygiene care, ambulatory care, and even housekeeping. Therefore, a
person cannot approach a long-term care insurance policy from the
perspective that it will cover all of her needs.95 Long-term care benefits
consist of cash payments, paid out daily or weekly, that can range from
$50-$400 per day.96 A more expensive indemnity policy allows the
policyholder to spend the benefit money on whatever care is most
appropriate for her (including reimbursement to unpaid caretakers). A lessexpensive reimbursement policy restricts the type of care on which the
benefit can be spent, and requires the policyholder to pay for the care up
front and get reimbursed later.97 Most policies have a deductible, or an
“elimination cost.”98 Before benefits are activated, the policyholder must
pay for her long-term care out-of-pocket for a designated time period, often
sixty to ninety days.99 Based on today’s numbers, this can total over

92. AM. ASS’N OF RETIRED PERS., THE COSTS OF LONG-TERM CARE: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
VERSUS REALITY 8 (2001) [hereinafter AARP].
93. Id. at 36.
94. Simon, supra note 4, at 53.
95. Simon, supra note 4, at 57.
96. LTC Insurance Basics, LONG TERM CARE INS. NAT’L ADVISORY, http://longtermcareinsur
ance.org/longtermcareinsurance.html#gpm1_3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
97. Id.
98. Simon, supra note 4, at 57.
99. Id.
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$10,000.100 However, since a policyholder can pay premiums for decades
before actually using the benefit, inflation plays a much more important
role. For example, a ninety-day elimination cost that is projected to cost
$18,000 when a policy is opened may end up costing over $40,000 by the
time the benefits are actually needed.101 To address this problem, long-term
care policies come with inflation protection that, in exchange for a higher
premium, increases the benefit amount according to a certain rate of
inflation established when the policy was purchased.102 Long-term care
insurance policies are usually time-limited, but more costly policies can be
purchased that provide perpetual coverage.103 Naturally, premium amounts
vary, but as a result of this unique structure the average monthly premium is
around $200.104 This is a significant amount of money for the average
middle-class American, many of whom simply cannot afford to pay it. A
1993 survey indicated that 91% of Americans who did not have long-term
care insurance said it was too expensive.105 Another study indicates that,
due to difficulties involved with anticipating inflation in medical costs,
adverse selection,106 and “imperfect competition” from Medicaid and other
alternatives to conventional long-term care,107 insurance premiums are
“marked up about 18 cents per dollar of premium above actuarially fair
levels” for people who buy a policy and keep it until they die.108 Another
possible reason why Americans tend to avoid private long-term care
insurance may include a belief that their families will provide long-term care
for them, and they are either ignorant of indemnity policies that provide
cash benefits that can be used to reimburse caretaker relatives or feel the
policies are too expensive to be justifiable in light of these alternatives.109
More recent research suggests that a person is better off saving her
money than putting it into long-term care insurance. For example, a 60year-old paying $2,500 per year in premiums for long-term care insurance
100. Id. at 58.
101. Id. (according to a 3% annual inflation rate and policy coverage that grows at 5% per
year).
102. LTC Insurance Basics, supra note 96.
103. Simon, supra note 4, at 66.
104. Id. at 58.
105. PIERRE PESTIEAU & GRÉGORY PONTHIÈRE, CTR. FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND
ECONOMETRICS, LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE PUZZLE 5 (2010), available at http://www.uclou
vain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2010_23web.pdf.
106. See infra pp. 16-17.
107. Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Medicaid Crowd-Out of Private Long-Term Care Insurance
Demand: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey, 21 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 4-5
(2007) (including alternatives such as help from unpaid caretakers and money transfers from
relatives).
108. Id. at 5.
109. PESTIEAU & PONTHIÈRE, supra note 105, at 8; Brown et al., supra note 107, at 5.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

194

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 5:181

can make three times the amount in benefits she will receive under the
policy by simply investing the money in a tax-free IRA instead.110 Instead of
being subjected to restrictions from the insurance company, the invested
money can be spent in any way the person wants.
The premium problem is part of a larger challenge faced by the private
long-term care insurance industry called adverse selection. Adverse
selection occurs when there are too many high-risk enrollees and not
enough low-risk enrollees.111 The private insurance industry relies on lowrisk policyholders for its very survival. The time-honored tradition of
underwriting “enables these insurers to determine eligibility for coverage and
charge premiums that are in line with the risk.”112 Therefore, low-risk
individuals are encouraged to buy policies because of the prospect of a
reasonable premium, while high-risk individuals are compelled to pay a
higher premium or risk going without coverage.113 The insurance policy
becomes profitable because the premium income from the low-risk enrollees
is higher than benefits that are paid out. Some insurance companies even
drop enrollees if they feel they have become too much of a risk.114 This has
become a somewhat common practice in the private health insurance
industry, and it was targeted by the ACA.115 However, the ACA takes into
account the adverse effects of banning this policy and replaces it with the
coverage mandate.116 It has no such provisions concerning long-term care
coverage. Underwriting is frequently used in the long-term care insurance
industry, but is less effective due to the lack of demand for coverage in the
United States117 Numerous studies have shown that adverse selection is a
particularly acute problem for the long-term care insurance industry.118
People who buy long-term care policies “have a higher probability of
becoming disabled than those who do not.”119 Conversely, people who
terminate their policies have a lower risk of becoming disabled.120 The
110. Simon, supra note 4, at 58.
111. Health Reform Glossary, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://healthreform.kff.org/health-re
form-glossary.aspx (last visited on Jan. 3, 2012).
112. ALLEN SCHMITZ, MILLIMAN, INC., ADVERSE SELECTION AND THE CLASS ACT 1 (2009); GARY
CLAXTON, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW PRIVATE INSURANCE WORKS: A PRIMER 4 (2002).
113. SCHMITZ, supra note 112, at 2.
114. CLAXTON, supra note 112, at 5.
115. See The Patients’ Bill of Rights, FAMILIES USA (Sept. 2010), http://familiesusa2.org/as
sets/pdfs/health-reform/Patients-Bill-of-Rights.pdf (discussing the practice of recession in the
health insurance industry, where an insurer cancels a policy retroactively to avoid paying
expensive current claims).
116. Id.
117. SCHMITZ, supra note 112, at 2.
118. PESTIEAU & PONTHIÈRE, supra note 105, at 6-7.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id.
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bottom line is that, to prevent adverse selection, a self-sustaining insurance
policy that is voluntary must have a mechanism for both attracting enrollees
and managing risk, either through an underwriting system or by limiting the
number of enrollees. If the policy guarantees coverage for anyone willing to
pay a premium, then it must find a way to counter-balance this risk by
becoming mandatory.121 This is an unusually difficult problem for long-term
care insurance policies in the United States.
Also, unlike conventional health insurance, there is no guarantee that
long-term care insurance will ever be needed, which encourages denial and
use of potential premium dollars in alternative ways. “[D]enial of the risk of
a potentially far-off event causes many healthy individuals to see little value
in purchasing and paying premiums on LTC coverage.”122 The level of
uncertainty and the cost of the insurance are high enough to generate a lot
of doubt in Americans’ minds. In a recent study, it was found that, when it
comes to long-term care insurance, people consider trade-offs that are
more profound than they would when considering health or auto
insurance.123 For example, someone may be choosing between paying for
long-term care insurance and putting enough money away for retirement.124
Others, who would rather leave a legacy to their heirs than pay for longterm care insurance, decide to use potential premium money toward a life
insurance policy instead.125 Although most Americans will probably need
long-term care at some point in their life, death is a certainty; so, the need
for life insurance, not only as a bequest but to pay for burial and other
costs, may seem more practical to someone with limited resources. Some
people also cite the fact that their parents died at an early age and did not
need long-term care, while others readily admit that they are in full denial of
the need for it.126 Taken in this context, the perceived level of uncertainty
about needing long-term care can be a powerful force behind a decision to
not insure against it.
Some scholars have noted “Medicaid crowding” as a barrier to the
growth of the private long-term care insurance industry.127 Medicaid
crowding is a process by which the demand for private insurance decreases
because of the expectation that Medicaid will be available to cover a
121. SCHMITZ, supra note 115, at 2.
122. Id.
123. Leslie A. Curry et al., Individual Decision Making in the Non-Purchase of Long-Term
Care Insurance, 49 GERONTOLOGIST 560, 563-64 (2009).
124. Id. at 564.
125. Id. at 565.
126. Id.
127. See generally Brown et al., supra note 107 (providing “empirical evidence of
Medicaid’s crowd out demand for private long-term care insurance”); see also PESTIEAU &
PONTHIÈRE, supra note 105, at 7.
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person’s long-term care needs when the time comes.128 A study by Jeffrey
R. Brown and Amy Finkelstein suggests that:
Medicaid may be able to explain the lack of private insurance purchases for
at least two-thirds of the wealth distribution . . . This is because Medicaid
imposes a substantial implicit tax on private long-term care insurance; for
example, they estimate that about 60 to 75 percent of the . . . benefits that
a median wealth individual would receive from a typical private long-term
care insurance policy are redundant of benefits that Medicaid would have
provided had the individual not purchased private insurance.129

Brown and Finkelstein argue that the State Long-Term Care Partnership
Program and the myriad of provisions of the DRA that restricted Medicaid
resource eligibility will not increase demand for private coverage as long as
Medicaid continues to provide the same coverage as private insurance
provides.130 Therefore, as long as Medicaid covers long-term care, it
greatly restricts purchases of private long-term care insurance. Despite this
exhaustive list of changes, demand for private long-term care insurance
remains flat, which corroborates the assertions of the “crowd out” theory.
Brown et al. estimate that, even if Medicaid resource requirements were
restricted to the greatest extent possible, demand for private insurance
would increase by only 2.7%.131 This would increase private insurance’s
share of long-term care funding from 9% to 9.2%.
IV. CLASS
In early 2010, after months of debate, Congress passed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).132 Dubbed the “Civil Rights
Act of the 21st Century” by Rep. James Clyburn (D-SC),133 its goal is to
expand health care coverage to almost all Americans while controlling
health care costs and not adversely affecting the budget deficit.134 It is
almost certainly the most significant piece of social reform legislation passed
since Medicaid was established in 1965. If it survives challenges in the
courts135 and opposition from conservatives, the ACA could fundamentally
change the role government plays in the American healthcare system.
128. See Brown et al., supra note 107, at 2-3; see also PESTIEAU & PONTHIÈRE, supra note
105, at 7.
129. Brown et al., supra note 107, at 3.
130. Id. at 23-24.
131. Id. at 1.
132. Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, House Votes on Party Lines, 219 to 212, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A1.
133. Id.
134. Id. at A16.
135. David E. Sanger, For Historic Stakes, a Big Obama Gamble on Partisan Victory, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A1, A16
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Section 2406 of the ACA sets the tone for the law’s approach to longterm care, and provides a concise and comprehensive history of long-term
care legislation:
Nearly 2 decades have passed since Congress seriously considered longterm care reform.
The United States Bipartisan Commission on
Comprehensive Health Care, also know[n] as the ‘‘Pepper Commission’’,
released its ‘‘Call for Action’’ blueprint for health reform in September
1990. In the 20 years since those recommendations were made, Congress
has never acted on the report . . . In 1999, under the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999),
individuals with disabilities have the right to choose to receive their longterm
services and supports in the community, rather than in an institutional
setting . . . Despite the Pepper Commission and Olmstead decision, the
long-term care provided to our Nation’s elderly and disabled has not
improved. In fact, for many, it has gotten far worse . . . In 2007, 69
percent of Medicaid long-term care spending for elderly individuals and
adults with physical disabilities paid for institutional services. Only 6 states
spent 50 percent or more of their Medicaid long-term care dollars on home
and community-based services for elderly individuals and adults with
physical disabilities while 1⁄2 of the States spent less than 25 percent. This
disparity continues even though, on average, it is estimated that Medicaid
dollars can support nearly 3 elderly individuals and adults with physical
disabilities in home and community-based services for every individual in a
nursing home. Although every State has chosen to provide certain services
under home and community-based waivers, these services are unevenly
available within and across States, and reach a small percentage of eligible
individuals . . . It is the sense of the Senate that . . . during the 111th
session of Congress, Congress should address long-term services and
supports in a comprehensive way that guarantees elderly and disabled
individuals the care they need; and . . . long term services and supports
should be made available in the community in addition to in institutions.136

Title VIII of the ACA established the Community Living Assistance Services
and Supports (“CLASS”) Act.137 CLASS was officially designated as Title XXIII
of the Public Health Services Act (hence the provisions are listed in section
3200, not 8000).138 Originally sponsored by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(D-MA),139 CLASS established the first government-sponsored long-term

136.
137.
138.
139.

ACA § 2406.
ACA § 8001.
ACA § 8002 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 201).
Community Living Assistance Services and Support Act (CLASS Act), CHANGES IN
HEALTH CARE FIN. & ORG. INITIATIVE (HCFO) (Feb. 2010) [hereinafter HCFO], http://www.hc
fo.org/publications/community-living-assistance-services-and-support-act-class-act (last visited
Dec 28, 2011).
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care insurance policy. The goals of CLASS were straightforward and very
clearly described in Section 3201:
(1) provide individuals with functional limitations with tools that will allow
them to maintain their personal and financial independence and live in the
community through a new financing strategy for community living assistance
services and supports; (2) establish an infrastructure that will help address
the Nation’s community living assistance services and supports needs; (3)
alleviate burdens on family caregivers; and (4) address institutional bias by
providing a financing mechanism that supports personal choice and
independence to live in the community.140

A major goal of CLASS was to discourage the use of nursing homes and
promote more independent living in the community.141 CLASS was “a
consumer-funded insurance pool that provides people a cash benefit to help
with simple chores of daily living so they can remain independent.”142
Similar to a private long-term care insurance policy, CLASS required a
monthly premium that vested after five years.143 Once a policyholder
developed two functional disabilities, he would qualify for a cash benefit to
help pay for in-home care costs.144 Section 3202 states that, to become
vested, a person would had to have paid a premium for sixty months, during
which period he must have worked enough to earn at least one quarter of
Social Security coverage in a three-year period.145 The premium must also
have been paid for twenty-four consecutive months during that period if
there was a lapse in payments of more than three months.146 These were
significant requirements, in that they emphasized the importance of an
enrollee being a wage earner. This differentiated CLASS from needs-based
programs, and made it much more akin to Social Security and Medicare,
meaning that a person need not impoverish herself to qualify for benefits.
Section 3203 required that the premium amounts be based on
projections to keep CLASS solvent over the next seventy-five years.147 It also
required reduced premiums for individuals living in poverty and for full-time
students (as long as they remained students).148 Premiums were designed to

140. ACA § 3201.
141. JOANNE KENEN, HEALTH AFFAIRS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: THE CLASS ACT 1 (2011),
available at http://healthaffairs.org/.healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_46.pdf.
142. John Iglehart, Long-Term Care Legislation at Long Last?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 8, 9 (2010).
143. Public Health Services Act (PHSA) § 3202(6)(B)(i), added by ACA § 8002 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-1); PHSA § 3203(a)(1)(B), added by ACA § 8002 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-2).
144. PHSA § 3203(a)(1)(C)(i), added by ACA § 8002.
145. PHSA § 3202(6)(B)(ii), added by ACA § 8002.
146. PHSA § 3202(6)(B)(iii), added by ACA § 8002.
147. PHSA § 3203(a)(1)(A)(i), added by ACA § 8002.
148. PHSA § 3203(a)(1)(A)(ii), added by ACA § 8002.
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never change, although HHS reserved the right to adjust them in order to
keep the program fiscally solvent, or if a person did not pay a premium for
five or more consecutive years.149 Individuals who reached age sixty-five or
paid a premium for twenty years were exempt from any premium
increases.150 “Benefit triggers” were also established in this section. A
vested individual could file a claim once she was determined to be unable
to perform at least two or three basic daily living activities (listed in Section
3202), lacked the cognitive ability to protect herself from “threats to health
and safety,” or had functional limitations similar to these two conditions.151
The cash benefit began at a minimum of $50 per day (paid daily or weekly;
Section 3205 allowed for monthly lump sums and rollovers, too) and was
variable depending on the scale of the individual’s functional limitations.152
For example, a person with four functional limitations would receive a
higher cash payment than someone with two limitations. There was no
lifetime limit on cash benefits.153
Section 3204 authorized employers to automatically enroll their
employees in the CLASS program.154 Premiums would have been paid
through payroll deductions similar to Social Security and Medicare.155
Everyone, however, had the option to opt-out of the program if he or she
chose.156
Section 3205 charged HHS with developing a system for enrollees to
apply for benefits, and for HHS to determine if they qualified.157 An enrollee
could be considered presumptively eligible if he applied for and attested to
being eligible for the maximum cash benefit, resided in a hospital or longterm care facility, and expected to leave within sixty days.158 Cash benefits
would be deposited directly into a beneficiary’s “Life Independence
Account”159 and would be accessible via a debit card.160 Section 3205
allowed the benefits to be spent on a variety of needs (respite care, assistive
technology, transportation, etc.) and did not establish any concrete limits on

149. PHSA § 3203(b)(1)(A)-(B), (E), added by ACA § 8002.
150. PHSA § 3203(b)(1)(B)(ii), added by ACA § 8002.
151. PHSA § 3203(a)(1)(C), added by ACA § 8002.
152. PHSA §§ 3203(a)(1)(D)(i), 3205(c)(4)(A)-(B), added by ACA § 8002 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll-2, -4).
153. PHSA § 3203(a)(1)(D)(iv), added by ACA § 8002.
154. PHSA § 3204(a)(1), added by ACA § 8002 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-3).
155. HCFO, supra note 139, at 2.
156. PHSA § 3204(b), added by ACA § 8002.
157. PHSA § 3205(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)(i), added by ACA § 8002.
158. PHSA § 3205(a)(2)(B), added by ACA § 8002.
159. PHSA § 3205(c)(1)(A), added by ACA § 8002.
160. PHSA § 3205(c)(1)(C)(ii), added by ACA § 8002.
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what the beneficiary may or may not buy.161 Besides a cash benefit, CLASS
beneficiaries would also receive advocacy and assistance counseling
services.162 An enrollee who lived in a nursing home and received Medicaid
would receive only 5% of her CLASS benefit, with the rest going to the
nursing home.163 Medicaid recipients who lived in home and communitybased (“HCB”) settings would keep half of their CLASS benefit, with the
other half going to the state to pay for Medicaid.164
Section 3206 established the CLASS Independence Fund.165 The CLASS
Independence Fund was going to be a trust fund into which CLASS
premiums were deposited.166 The fund was to be used only to pay out
CLASS benefits and administrative costs.167 The U.S. Department of
Treasury was authorized to invest money in the fund to enhance its value.168
Section 3206 also established a Board of Trustees consisting of the
Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of the Treasury, and
two private citizens who could not be members of the same party.169 The
Board was intended to review the fiscal solvency of the CLASS Independence
Fund and make annual policy recommendations regarding its use.170
Besides the Board of Trustees, Section 3207 established the CLASS
Independence Advisory Council, which was to be comprised of fifteen
private citizens, “a majority of whom [would] be representatives of
individuals who participate[d] or [we]re likely to [have] participate[d] in the
CLASS program.”171 The Advisory Council, the members of which would be
appointed by the President, was charged with overseeing the system and
making its own recommendations as to premium amounts, fiscal solvency,
and the development of the benefit plan.172
To keep the program solvent, Section 3208 required the Secretary of
HHS to regularly consult with the advisory council and the Board of Trustees
“for purposes of ensuring that enrollees’ premiums [we]re adequate to
ensure the financial solvency of the CLASS program.”173 No taxpayer
dollars were to be used to fund CLASS, so the program would have had to

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

PHSA § 3205(c)(1)(B), added by ACA § 8002.
PHSA § 3205(b)(2), (3), added by ACA § 8002.
PHSA § 3205(c)(1)(D)(i), added by ACA § 8002.
PHSA § 3205(c)(1)(D)(ii)(II), added by ACA § 8002.
PHSA § 3206, added by ACA § 8002 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-5).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
PHSA § 3206, added by ACA § 8002.
Id.
Id.
PHSA § 3208, added by ACA § 8002 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-7).
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rely completely on the premium payments from enrollees and any returns on
the fund’s investments to stay fiscally balanced.174 The Secretary of HHS
was charged with submitting an annual report on the state of the CLASS
program beginning January 1, 2014.175 Finally, information about CLASS
was required to be added to the National Clearinghouse for Long-Term
Care that was established in Section 6021 of the DRA.176
V. SIZING UP CLASS AGAINST THE INDUSTRY’S PROBLEMS
Like all private industries, the private long-term care industry’s purpose is
to make money. It does not exist for the purpose of guaranteeing long-term
care coverage for all Americans; only those who pay for it, and at a level
commensurate with the likelihood that they will need the coverage. Due to
adverse selection, it is not possible for the private insurance industry to cover
all Americans who need coverage.177 At the other end is Medicaid, which is
designed to guarantee long-term care coverage for Americans who lack the
income and resources to pay for it themselves. As long as a person is
impoverished enough to meet the eligibility requirements, that person
cannot be denied coverage. The cost of this program to taxpayers is not of
primary importance. CLASS was an attempt at a middle option. It was
designed to help all working Americans pay for long-term care without
adding to the budget deficit. The two major barriers that prevented CLASS
from achieving this goal were the fact that the program was voluntary, and
that it guaranteed coverage.
The first problem to tackle is the fact that Americans are unprepared for
their own long-term care.178 Adding CLASS to the clearinghouse of longterm care policies was unlikely to have any effect on awareness, based on
the findings cited above.179 The provisions of the DRA had no real effect in
either promoting the awareness of private long-term care insurance, or even
its use. CLASS focused on wage earners, so it targeted the demographic
group that seems to be the most unaware of the need for long-term care.
Also, including CLASS premiums with Social Security and Medicare payroll
taxes would have certainly drawn attention to the program, and therefore,
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. PHSA § 3210, added by ACA § 8002 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-9); see
also Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6021, 120 Stat. 4, 68 (2006)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p).
177. SCHMITZ, supra note 112.
178. AARP, supra note 92.
179. Compare SCHMITZ, supra note 112, at 3 (explaining that CLASS would be minimally
marketed), with AARP, supra note 92, at 10 (contending that Americans know little about
long-term care coverage, often mistakenly thinking they have long-term care coverage when
they do not).
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the issue of long-term care at large. CLASS premiums were expected to cost
between $160 and $240 per month.180 The fact that everyone with a
paycheck would have been automatically enrolled181 was certain to draw
attention. It may seem humorous (or tragic, depending on your
perspective), but such a shock to workers’ paychecks may have had the
effect of starting a national debate on the issue of long-term care financing;
one that the nation desperately needs to have.
CLASS was not structured in a way that made it so significantly different
than a private insurance policy in order to encourage more Americans to
get long-term care insurance. In fact, it may very well have resulted in
higher premiums for its members. Unlike Medicaid, which is fee-forservice,182 CLASS was structured like a private long-term care indemnity
policy. Indemnity policies are more costly than reimbursement policies,
which restrict the services for which the cash benefit can be used. The
CLASS benefit could have been used for any of the beneficiary’s needs.183
There was no lifetime limit to CLASS benefits, which is another feature of a
high-end LTC policy.184 There were also no “elimination periods” under
CLASS—a rarity among private policies.185 To deal with inflation, the
CLASS premium was to be based on projections that kept the program
solvent for the next seventy-five years.186 Inflation protection is another
“added feature” of private policies, which further adds to the premium
amount.187 Therefore, CLASS was structured like a top-of-the-line long-term
care insurance policy. If the average LTC policy premium is $200 per
month,188 it is not unreasonable to expect the CLASS premium to have been
higher than that. Moreover, enrollees would have been subsidizing
premiums for full-time students and the poor, who were projected to pay
only $5 per month in premiums.189 The only provisions that may have kept
the premium amount under control were the sixty-month vesting period,190
the requirement that all members must be wage earners during those sixty
months,191 and automatic enrollment.192 Assuming that wage earners are

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

SCHMITZ, supra note 112, at 3.
PHSA § 3203, added by ACA § 8002.
KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 1.
PHSA § 3205, added by ACA § 8002.
PHSA § 3203, added by ACA § 8002.
Id.
Id.
See Simon, supra note 4, at 60.
Id. at 58.
SCHMITZ, supra note 112, at 3.
PHSA § 3202, added by ACA § 8002.
Id.
PHSA § 3204, added by ACA § 8002.
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less likely to need long-term care, the sixty-month requirement should have
helped to keep CLASS solvent in the short term. Automatic enrollment
should also have helped initially with the collection of premiums, but would
have become less effective over time as more enrollees opted-out of the
program. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office projected that CLASS
would have increased government revenues in its first ten years, and was a
major reason why the ACA was considered deficit-neutral.193 However,
unless HHS found a way to keep the premiums lower-than-average,
consumers would have likely continued to believe it is in their best interests
to invest potential premium dollars in a retirement account, instead of
locking them into a long-term care insurance policy.194
Enter adverse selection. Despite automatic enrollment, there was no
escaping the fact that the CLASS program was voluntary, which meant that
an informed wage earner, not wanting to pay a premium, could opt-out of
the program. 195 Participation rates in CLASS were estimated to be between
2% and 6%.196 Individual reasons for opting-out are legion, and it is
unlikely that the majority of the workers who refused to pay for CLASS would
have done so because they had an alternative plan in place to pay for their
own long-term care.197 Critics of CLASS claim that this would have created
a system in which younger and healthier wage earners opted out of paying
the premium, leaving the people most likely to need CLASS as the only
enrollees.198 Since CLASS coverage was guaranteed and funded almost
solely by premiums,199 HHS would have been obliged to cover the vested
enrollees, so the consequences to the solvency of the program are obvious.
The Board of Trustees of the CLASS Independence Fund would have been
charged with ensuring that premiums for this high-end indemnity policy were
competitive with (if not lower than) private industry premiums.200 This would
have been balanced with the need to keep the program fiscally sound, while
guaranteeing benefits to recipients at the same time. The premium amounts
were crucial to the program’s survival:
Those who oppose the CLASS Act caution that to the extent premiums are
set too high to attract enrollees or are raised over time to support the
program, the program is likely to lose healthier individuals, while retaining
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

HCFO, supra note 139.
Curry et al., supra note 123, at 563-64.
PHSA § 3201, added by ACA § 8002 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ll).
SCHMITZ, supra note 112, at 3.
AARP, supra note 92.
SCHMITZ, supra note 112, at 2.
PHSA § 3208, added by ACA § 8002.
NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, THE COMMUNITY LIVING ASSISTANCE SERVICES AND
SUPPORTS (CLASS) ACT: MAJOR LEGISLATIVE PR0VISIONS 7-8 (2010), available at http://www.nh
pf.org/library/the-basics/Basics_CLASSAct_06-09-10.pdf.
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those with significant needs. This adverse selection could jeopardize the
long-term viability of the program.201

Frank Keating, CEO of the American Council of Life Insurers, contended
that “the assumption underlying [CLASS’s] financing—that a very high
percentage of working Americans will voluntarily participate—is
unrealistic . . . overall participation is likely to be far lower . . . potentially
leading to very high premiums.”202 The major difference between CLASS,
Medicare, and Medicaid is that CLASS was voluntary, and did not have
access to taxpayer dollars. In this respect, it was more like a private
insurance policy than any other government-sponsored healthcare program.
However, since CLASS guaranteed coverage to anyone who enrolled—
unlike private insurance—it appears to have had none of the protections
necessary to prevent adverse selection.
Without making CLASS mandatory, workers would have to have been
convinced to enroll in the program. There do not appear to be any
provisions in CLASS that took into account the myriad reasons (besides the
premium amount) why Americans avoid long-term care insurance in the first
place. As has already been mentioned, the automatic enrollment feature
would certainly make workers aware of the possibility that they may
someday need long-term care.203 However, once people opted-out of the
program, they could go right back into the state of denial that many of them
confess to have.204 One segment of the public states that it avoids longterm care insurance because it does not trust insurance brokers to give them
a fair deal.205 CLASS would have made long-term care coverage available
to people without having to consult with brokers; however, people’s lack of
trust in the solvency of CLASS, or in the government overall, may have
erased any gains that could be made with this group. There were no
provisions in the ACA to market CLASS, and there was no evidence that
CLASS was designed to address most Americans’ beliefs that, when given a
choice, they would rather spend potential premium dollars on life insurance,
retirement, their children’s inheritance, or plan for events that are inevitable,
instead of just “possible.”206
It is also unclear what effect CLASS would have had on the so-called
Medicaid “crowd out” problem. The crowd out theory asserts that, no
matter how restrictive eligibility rules become, Medicaid will always limit the
size of the private long-term care insurance market as long as it covers the

201.
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HCFO, supra note 139.
Iglehart, supra note 142, at 9.
See SCHMITZ, supra note 112, at 4.
Curry et al., supra note 123, at 565.
Id.
Id. at 564.
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same services.207 CLASS would have added a third player to this dynamic.
On its face, it may seem that CLASS would have further crowded out private
insurance. CLASS, however, was much more akin to a private policy than to
Medicaid. Both CLASS and private policies would have been voluntary. A
person chooses to buy these types of policies as part of the overall planning
for her future. Medicaid is a program of necessity. It is the last resort.
Although technically voluntary, Medicaid is needed when a person is
impoverished and can no longer afford to pay for long-term care. Often, it
comes down to a choice between Medicaid and a shorter life span. Focus
groups and other data indicate that there is some credence to the argument
that Americans expect the government to cover at least some of their longterm care.208 Based on its structure, CLASS would probably have done little
to address this condition. “Crowd out” does not seem to be any more
significant, however, than the numerous other reasons that are given for why
more people do not have private coverage.209 The bottom line is that the
cost of long-term care is incredibly high, and too few Americans buy longterm care insurance for a number of diverse reasons. Because of this,
Medicaid ends up paying for more long-term care than any other funding
source. To prevent this problem from getting worse, policymakers must
more aggressively address the real problem: the public’s ambivalence
toward buying long-term care insurance.
VI. CREATING A CLASS PROGRAM THAT WORKS
Since CLASS was voluntary, wage earners would have to have been
persuaded to participate in the program to make it work. However, CLASS
did little in the way of changing the conditions surrounding why Americans
tend to avoid long-term care insurance. Since it guaranteed the equivalent
of a high-end long-term care indemnity for all of its enrollees, it needed to
counter-balance the costs of this provision by either taking in taxpayer
dollars or, like health insurance under the ACA, making enrollment
mandatory.
Making CLASS a taxpayer-funded program like Medicaid would defeat
the purpose of the program, much of which was to decrease the number
people relying on the government to pay for long-term care and thus reduce
the budget deficit and the overall burden of the program on taxpayers.
CLASS was a fundamental alternative to Medicaid. Moreover, opposition to
CLASS as just another “big government entitlement program” was

207. Brown et al., supra note 107, at 2, 22.
208. Curry et al., supra note 123, at 564-65; see also AARP, supra note 92, at 26-27.
209. PESTIEAU & PONTHIÈRE, supra note 105, at 7.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

206

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 5:181

significant.210 In 2009, a bipartisan group of Senators wrote a letter to
Majority Leader Harry Reid requesting that CLASS be removed from the
ACA.211 The letter states: “We have grave concerns that the real effect of
the provisions would be to create a new federal entitlement program with
large, long-term spending increases that far exceed revenues.”212 In
addition to the problem of cost, it may have been easy for an opponent of
CLASS to convince voters that it was an ostensible tax increase, and a
hostile, or even a frugal Congress could have chipped away at its provisions
over time.
In reviewing the effectiveness of CLASS, it is clear that the automatic
enrollment requirement addressed the problems facing long-term care
insurance in the United States more than any other provision in the law. It is
the compulsory nature of this requirement that would have made it effective.
However, since enrollees could opt-out of CLASS, automatic enrollment
would have lost its effectiveness over the long-run and made the program
vulnerable to opposition. A simple amendment to a bill stating that wage
earners are not automatically enrolled in CLASS could have been
devastating for the program’s financial condition and effectiveness.
Therefore, to eliminate this vulnerability, CLASS enrollment would have to be
mandatory.
Overall, the ACA is about guaranteeing health care coverage for as
many Americans as possible. The law succinctly states that “each health
insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or
group market in a State must accept every employer and individual in the
State that applies for such coverage.”213 Various other clauses of the ACA
protect policyholders from being rejected for pre-existing conditions,214

210. See, e.g., Editorial, CLASS Dismissed: Killing an unaffordable new entitlement,
CHICAGO TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ctedit-class-20111018,0,5561459.story (finding the CLASS Act to be “a big overreach on the
part of the administration, which was too intent on expanding access to health insurance and
not intent enough on containing costs”); Susan Berry, Obamacare Has No CLASS:
Administration Admits Entitlement Program Unsustainable, BIG GOVERNMENT (Oct. 15, 2011,
11:03 AM), http://biggovernment.com/sberry/2011/10/15/obamacare-has-no-class-adminis
tration-admits-entitlement-program-unsustainable/ (critiquing the CLASS Act as “an
entitlement within an entitlement” that would have eventually needed government funds as it
became “too big to fail”).
211. Letter from Kent Conrad, Sen., U.S. Senate, Joseph Lieberman, Sen., U.S. Senate,
Mary Landrieu, Sen., U.S. Senate, Evan Bayh, Sen., U.S. Senate, Blanche Lincoln, Sen., U.S.
Senate, Ben Nelson, Sen., U.S. Senate, and Mark Warner, Sen., U.S. Senate, to Harry Reed
Sen., Minority Leader, U.S. Senate (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.politico.com/stat
ic/PPM145_chris_memo1.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
212. Iglehart, supra note 142, at 9.
213. PHSA § 2702, added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1).
214. PHSA § 2705, added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4).
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lifetime limits on coverage,215 and excessive premiums and deductibles to
name a few. 216 Medicaid eligibility is expanded to include everyone under
age 65 with income less than 133% of the federal poverty level.217 Most
Americans with incomes above that amount who do not have employersponsored insurance will be able to get subsidized premiums for health
plans through the exchange system.218 In response to this vast expansion of
coverage, Chapter 48 of the ACA establishes the “Requirement to Maintain
Minimum Essential Coverage,”219 commonly known as the individual
mandate. Effective January 1, 2014, anyone who goes without “minimum
essential health care coverage” for a month or more will pay a tax penalty
of up to $750 per person (with a limit at $2,250) on an annual basis.220 If
it survives in the courts,221 this penalty will be phased in and will be fully
effective after 2016.222 Exceptions are made to take into account
incarcerated individuals, people whose religious beliefs preclude them from
getting health insurance, illegal immigrants, heads of household under age
18, and individuals claiming a hardship exemption.223 The purpose of the
health care mandate is described very clearly in Section 1501:
if there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase
health insurance until they needed care. By significantly increasing health
insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of
this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health
insurance premiums. The requirement is essential to creating effective
health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that
215. PHSA § 2711, added by ACA § 10101 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11).
216. PHSA § 2701, added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg)
(prohibiting discriminatory premium rates); ACA § 1302(c)(2) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
18022) (limiting deductibles in the small group market to $2,000 for an individual and
$4,000 for any other plan).
217. ACA § 2001 (amending 42 U.S.C. 1396a).
218. ACA § 1401 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36B).
219. ACA § 1501 (amending I.R.C. § 5000A).
220. Id.
221. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 565 U.S. __ (Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-393) (granting review of the entire petition);
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 565 U.S. __ (Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400) (granting review of the third question
presented on the issue of severability and the first question presented); U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 565 U.S. __ (Nov.
14, 2011) (No. 11-398) (granting review of the first question presented: ”Whether the suit
brought by the respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §
7421(a)”).
222. ACA § 1501.
223. Id.
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are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions
can be sold.224

This clause alone makes it very clear that the framers of the ACA were
concerned about adverse selection when they guaranteed health insurance
coverage for all Americans. It also makes it disturbingly clear that CLASS
was unlikely to stay fiscally solvent without a coverage mandate of its own.
A coverage mandate would bluntly address Americans’ lack of
preparation for their own long-term care. All working Americans would
have guaranteed long-term care insurance once they were fully vested in the
program. Moreover, since the program was funded almost exclusively by
premiums, people were less likely to view it as “welfare,” and more likely to
view it as a program similar to Medicare and Social Security. With the
mandate in place, the structure of CLASS might have worked to its
advantage. Premium payers were exclusively wage earners, most of whom
are at a lower risk to need long-term care. The CBO estimated that CLASS
enrollees would not start taking out benefits in a substantive way for at least
ten years from the program’s inception.225 Having an abundance of
premium payers early on would enhance the program’s fiscal solvency, and
should have allowed it to charge lower premiums, possibly as low as $37
per month.226 This not only addresses the ubiquitous complaint that longterm care insurance is too expensive,227 but it also would allow CLASS to
stay structured like a high-end indemnity policy for a much longer period of
time. The mandate would also weaken the argument that a person is better
off putting potential premium dollars into a retirement fund, since premium
payments may drop low enough to make long-term care insurance a more
practical option. Most importantly, a mandate would address the adverse
selection problem. As the ACA points out, when health care coverage is
guaranteed, it must be counter-balanced with a mandate.228 The only other
alternative is to limit coverage or fund the program with tax dollars, both of
which defeat the purpose of the program. The mandate also eliminates the
denial and uncertainty problems that Americans have with long-term care
insurance planning.
This leaves the “Medicaid crowding” problem. The primary principle
behind this theory is that, as long as Medicaid covers the same service that
long-term care insurance covers, the long-term care insurance industry will

224. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091) (emphasis added).
225. Iglehart, supra note 142, at 9.
226. Edward Allen Miller, Flying Beneath the Radar of Health Reform: The Community
Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, 51 GERONTOLOGIST 145, 152 (2011).
227. PESTIEAU & PONTHIÈRE, supra note 105, at 5.
228. ACA § 1501 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091).
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be weaker.229 Even without a mandate, the Congressional Budget Office
“projected the CLASS program to generate $2 billion in Medicaid
savings.”230 Clearly, mandatory participation in CLASS would augment this
savings and insure a huge portion of the population against long-term care
costs. Modifying the mandate to require long-term care insurance under a
choice of CLASS or private insurance would, by definition, reduce the
crowding problem. The experience of other countries supports this notion.
Mandatory CLASS-style long-term care policies exist in other countries
and appear to be successful in meeting both their social and fiscal goals.
Germany’s program is entirely comprehensive, and includes a choice of
nursing home, HCB care, or cash benefit coverage.231 There is no longer
any “Medicaid” coverage of these services as it is known in the United
States.232 Germany has a dedicated fund similar to the CLASS
Independence Fund, although “everyone (including employers)” contributes
to it, not just wage-earning volunteers.233 If a person does not want to
contribute to the government program, he must buy private long-term care
insurance.234 When given the choice of these three options, the cash benefit
is the most popular.235 Although the benefits of cash payments amount to
less than those of HCB, they are sufficient enough to enable an otherwiseunpaid caregiver to provide care as often as she needs to.236 Some
caregivers even get vacation time and are able to use the cash benefit to
hire a personal attendant.237 Therefore, the German system has been at
least somewhat effective in turning the role of unpaid caregiver into a form
of employment. The options available to citizens are also well-integrated,
so people can choose between hybrids of cash, HCB services, and nursing
home care.238 Perhaps most importantly, the German model has no
resource or income guidelines, so individuals do not have to impoverish
themselves to qualify for coverage. 239 This applies to all of the types of
care, not just the cash benefit.240 Finally, the German system is fiscally

229. Brown et al., supra note 107, at 24.
230. Miller, supra note 226, at 149.
231. John Creighton Campbell et al., Lessons from Public Long-Term Care Insurance in
Germany and Japan, 29 HEALTH AFF. 87, 86-88 (2010).
232. GLECKMAN, supra note 89, at 8.
233. Campbell et al., supra note 231, at 88; GLECKMAN, supra note 89, at 7 (“everyone”
includes employers).
234. GLECKMAN, supra note 89, at 6.
235. Campbell et al., supra note 231, at 90.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 88.
240. Campbell et al., supra note 231, at 88.
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solvent, although continued reforms are necessary to keep it solvent in the
coming decades.241 Japan’s system is similar to Germany’s, but does not
include a cash option.242 Providers of long-term care under the German
and Japanese systems are overwhelmingly private entities,243 so, despite
what some commentators may call a “socialist” model of coverage, a
successful private-public partnership has been established. Other nations,
like Britain,244 France,245 and the Netherlands,246 have similar systems: the
long-term care coverage is comprehensive, mandatory, and, with the
exception of Britain,247 does not have impoverishing eligibility
requirements.248
The United States does not have to create a coverage system as
elaborate as those in Europe and Japan to effectively address the problem
of long-term care. Similar to the ACA, it could rely on private firms to
provide the policies, while instituting a mandate for everyone to have longterm care insurance. CLASS could even be reformed into a “minimal
coverage” program into which people would be enrolled if they did not get
coverage on their own. The mandate, however, is what makes any of this
possible. Scholarly commentary on CLASS had only just begun when the
program was eliminated, but the consensus of those studying the program
was that it would be largely ineffective without a mandate.249
VII. CONCLUSION
Long-term care is unique. As much as it is an issue for the person
getting the care, it is an issue for someone else: a loved one, a friend, an
attendant, a nurse, a physician, a neighbor. It is a public charge, almost
exclusively funded by the care recipient’s family or by taxpayers.250 No one
wants it. It also seems, at times, that no one wants to address the
challenges faced by an aging nation that will need more and more of it as
the 21st Century progresses. There are, however, reasons to be optimistic.
Democrats and Republicans both understand that there is a problem

241. GLECKMAN, supra note 89, at 8.
242. Campbell et al., supra note 231, at 90.
243. Id. at 88.
244. GLECKMAN, supra note 89, at 16.
245. See id. at 14-16.
246. See id. at 9-11.
247. Id. at 16.
248. Id. at 14-15 (France); id. at 9 (the Netherlands).
249. See Miller, supra note 226, at 151-52 (besides pointing out many of the same flaws
discussed here, Miller points out that CLASS has a number of potentially useful features;
particularly its accessibility to younger policyholders and the existence of cash benefits in place
of service-based benefits).
250. KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 1.
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funding long-term care. The conservative DRA attempted to address the
problem and was not successful, but scholars have since been able to
identify reasons why that was the case. The progressive ACA took significant
steps toward reforming the American long-term care system through the
CLASS Act. CLASS, however, was fundamentally flawed and was unlikely to
remain fiscally solvent. A long-term care insurance mandate, similar to the
ACA’s health insurance mandate, would have given the program the vitality
it needed to be effective. Perhaps more ambitious reforms, like those seen
in Germany and other countries, will be attainable in the future. However,
for now we are in a position to keep moving in that direction. In spite of the
vitriol in politics these days, the inexorable march of time is still powerful
enough to make Republicans and Democrats work together toward a
common goal, particularly with the public debt expanding at ever-growing
rates. After all, all of us want to live a long time, and, sooner or later, we
will all have to pay the price of age.
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